Correspondence Theory of Semantic Information

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/714804
Publication The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
ISSN 0007-0882
Date April 15, 2021
Extra Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
DOI 10.1086/714804
Accessed 2021-04-22 08:39:35
Library Catalog journals.uchicago.edu (Atypon)

Source: Publications

Paweł Gładziejewski: Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for April, 16th, at 12:00 (CET). Our guest will be Paweł Gładziejewski (Department of Cognitive Science, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun). We will discuss a draft paper: Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account

Abstract: In this paper, I use the predictive processing (PP) theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind- independent world. My main goal is to elucidate the epistemology of perception already implicit in PP. But I also hope to show how it is possible to peacefully combine central tenets of foundationalist and coherentist accounts of the rational powers of perception while avoiding the well-recognized pitfalls of either.

To get a Google Meet link, email Przemysław Nowakowski at pnowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

Uljana Feest: Data Quality, Experimental Artifacts, and the Reactivity of the Psychological Subject Matter

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for April, 9th, at 16:00 (CET). Note the change of the usual time! Our guest will be Uljana Feest (Institut für Philosophie, Leibniz Universität Hannover). We will discuss a draft paper: Data Quality, Experimental Artifacts, and the Reactivity of the Psychological Subject Matter

Abstract: While the term “reactivity” has come to be associated with specific phenomena in the social sciences, having to do with subjects’ awareness of being studied, this paper takes a broader stance on this concept. I will argue that reactivity is a ubiquitous feature of the psychological subject matter and that this fact is a precondition of experimental research, while also posing potential problems for the experimenter. The latter are connected to the worry about distorted data and experimental artifacts. But what are experimental artifacts and what is the most productive way of dealing with them? In this paper, I approach these questions by exploring the ways in which experimenters in psychology simultaneously exploit and suppress the reactivity of their subject matter in order to produce experimental data that speak to the question or subject matter at hand. Highlighting the artificiality of experimental data. I will raise (and answer) the question of what distinguishes a genuine experimental result from an experimental artifact. My analysis construes experimental results as the outcomes of inferences from the data that take material background assumptions as auxiliary premises. Artifacts occur when one or more of these background assumptions are false, such that the data do not reliably serve the purposes they were generated for. I will conclude by laying out the ways in which my analysis of data quality is relevant to, and informed by, recent debates about the replicability of experimental results.

To receive a Google Meet link, please email Przemysław Nowakowski at pnowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity