Paweł Gładziejewski: Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for April, 16th, at 12:00 (CET). Our guest will be Paweł Gładziejewski (Department of Cognitive Science, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun). We will discuss a draft paper: Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account

Abstract: In this paper, I use the predictive processing (PP) theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind- independent world. My main goal is to elucidate the epistemology of perception already implicit in PP. But I also hope to show how it is possible to peacefully combine central tenets of foundationalist and coherentist accounts of the rational powers of perception while avoiding the well-recognized pitfalls of either.

To get a Google Meet link, email Przemysław Nowakowski at pnowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

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