Thinking about Semantic Information

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL http://avant.edu.pl/en/2020-02-08
Volume XI
Issue 2
Pages 1-10
Publication Avant
Date 2020
Extra Library Catalog: avant.edu.pl
DOI 10.26913/avant.2020.02.08
Accessed 2020-02-29 11:14:23
Language en-US
Abstract In his recent book, Daniel Dennett defends a novel account of semantic information in terms of design worth getting (Dennett, 2017). While this is an interesting proposal in itself, my purpose in this commentary is to challenge several of Dennett’s claims. First, he argues that semantic information can be transferred without encoding and storing it. Second, this lack of encoding is what makes semantic information unmeasurable. However, the argument for both these claims, presented by Dennett as an intuition pump, is invalid.

Source: Publications

Tracking the Objects of the Psychopathology

Type Journal Article
Author Przemysław Nowakowski
URL http://avant.edu.pl/en/2020-01-05
Volume XI
Issue 1
Pages 1-14
Publication AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
Date 2020
DOI 10.26913/avant.2020.01.05
Accessed 2020-01-06 15:41:38
Language en-US

Source: Publications

Representational unification in cognitive science: Is embodied cognition a unifying perspective?

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
Author Przemysław Nowakowski
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-019-02445-w
Publication Synthese
ISSN 0039-7857, 1573-0964
Date 2019-10-24
Journal Abbr Synthese
DOI 10.1007/s11229-019-02445-w
Accessed 2019-10-25 13:26:31
Library Catalog DOI.org (Crossref)
Language en
Short Title Representational unification in cognitive science

Source: Publications

Mechanisms in psychology: The road towards unity?

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
Author Mateusz Hohol
Author Przemysław Nowakowski
URL https://doi.org/10.1177/0959354319875218
Volume 29
Issue 5
Pages 567-578
Publication Theory & Psychology
ISSN 0959-3543
Date October 1, 2019
Journal Abbr Theory & Psychology
DOI 10.1177/0959354319875218
Accessed 2019-10-18 13:49:47
Library Catalog SAGE Journals
Language en
Abstract The focus of this special issue of Theory & Psychology is on explanatory mechanisms in psychology, especially on problems of particular prominence for psychological science such as theoretical integration and unification. Proponents of the framework of mechanistic explanation claim, in short, that satisfactory explanations in psychology and related fields are causal. They stress the importance of explaining phenomena by describing mechanisms that are responsible for them, in particular by elucidating how the organization of component parts and operations in mechanisms gives rise to phenomena in certain conditions. We hope for cross-pollination between philosophical approaches to explanation and experimental psychology, which could offer methodological guidance, in particular where mechanism discovery and theoretical integration are at issue. Contributions in this issue pertain to theoretical integration and unification of psychology as well as the growing importance of causal mechanistic explanations in psychological science.
Short Title Mechanisms in psychology

Source: Publications

Extending Bayesian Models of the Rubber Hand Illusion

Type Journal Article
Author Piotr Litwin
URL https://brill.com/view/journals/msr/aop/article-10.1163-22134808-20191440.xml
Pages 1-34
Publication Multisensory Research
ISSN 2213-4794, 2213-4808
Date 2019
Journal Abbr Multisens. Res.
DOI 10.1163/22134808-20191440
Accessed 2019-09-22 11:45:12
Library Catalog DOI.org (Crossref)
Abstract Abstract
Human body sense is surprisingly flexible — in the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), precisely administered visuo-tactile stimulation elicits a sense of ownership over a fake hand. The general consensus is that there are certain semantic top-down constraints on which objects may be incorporated in this way: in particular, to-be-embodied objects should be structurally similar to a visual representation stored in an internal body model. However, empirical evidence shows that the sense of ownership may extend to objects strikingly distinct in morphology and structure (e.g., robotic arms) and the hypothesis about the relevance of appearance lacks direct empirical support. Probabilistic multisensory integration approaches constitute a promising alternative. However, the recent Bayesian models of RHI limit too strictly the possible factors influencing likelihood and prior probability distributions. In this paper, I analyse how Bayesian models of RHI could be extended. The introduction of skin-based spatial information can account for the cross-compensation of sensory signals giving rise to RHI. Furthermore, addition of Bayesian Coupling Priors, depending on (1) internal learned models of relatedness (coupling strength) of sensory cues, (2) scope of temporal binding windows, and (3) extension of peripersonal space, would allow quantification of individual tendencies to integrate divergent visual and somatosensory signals. The extension of Bayesian models would yield an empirically testable proposition accounting comprehensively for a wide spectrum of RHI-related phenomena and rendering appearance-oriented internal body models explanatorily redundant.

Source: Publications

Proprioceptive Precision and Degree of Visuo-Proprioceptive Discrepancy Do Not Influence the Strength of the Rubber Hand Illusion

Type Journal Article
Author Paweł Motyka
Author Piotr Litwin
URL http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0301006619865189
Pages 030100661986518
Publication Perception
ISSN 0301-0066, 1468-4233
Date 2019-07-30
Journal Abbr Perception
DOI 10.1177/0301006619865189
Accessed 2019-08-18 08:54:11
Library Catalog DOI.org (Crossref)
Language en

Source: Publications

Foundations of Geometric Cognition

Type Book
Author Mateusz Hohol
Place New York
Publisher Routledge
ISBN 978-0-367-17344-9 978-0-367-17345-6
Date 2019
Extra OCLC: 1101774953
Library Catalog Open WorldCat
Language English

Source: Publications

Fallible Heuristics and Evaluation of Research Traditions. The Case of Embodied Cognition

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/RF/article/view/RF.2019.031
Rights ##submission.copyrightStatement##
Volume 75
Issue 2
Pages 223-236
Publication Ruch Filozoficzny
ISSN 2545-3173
Date 2019/06/22
DOI 10.12775/RF.2019.031
Accessed 2019-06-23 11:09:42
Library Catalog apcz.umk.pl
Language en
Abstract In this paper, I argue that embodied cognition, like many other research traditions in cognitive science, offers mostly fallible research heuristics rather than
grand principles true of all cognitive processing. To illustrate this claim, I discuss
Aizawa’s rebuttal of embodied and enactive accounts of vision. While Aizawa’s argument is sound against a strong reading of the enactive account, it does not
undermine the way embodied cognition proceeds, because the claim he attacks
is one of fallible heuristics. These heuristics may be helpful in developing models
of cognition in an interdisciplinary fashion. I briefly discuss the issue of whether
this fallibility actually makes embodied cognition vulnerable to charges of being untestable or non-scientific. I also stress that the historical approach to this
research tradition suggests that embodied cognition is not poised to become
a grand unified theory of cognition.

Source: Publications

Epistemic Challenges: Engaging Philosophically in Cognitive Science

Type Journal Article
Author Przemysław R. Nowakowski
URL https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/RF/article/view/RF.2019.032
Rights ##submission.copyrightStatement##
Volume 75
Issue 2
Pages 237-255
Publication Ruch Filozoficzny
ISSN 2545-3173
Date 2019/06/22
DOI 10.12775/RF.2019.032
Accessed 2019-06-23 11:07:39
Library Catalog apcz.umk.pl
Language en
Abstract In this article, I show the role that the philosopher of cognitive science can currently play in cognitive science research. I argue for the important, and not yet considered, role of the philosophy of cognitive science in cognitive science, that
is, the importance of cooperation between philosophers of science with cognitive scientists in investigating the research methods and theoretical assumptions of cognitive science. At the beginning of the paper I point out, how the
philosopher of science, here, the philosopher of cognitive science, can participate
in interdisciplinary research. I am opting of the cooperation in investigating the
so-called reflective problems. Then, I discuss four examples of issues important
for the cognitive science, in which the competences possessed by the philosopher
are useful. At the ending I point out wider landscape of possible cooperation
of philosophers with cognitive scientists.
Short Title Wyzwania epistemiczne

Source: Publications

Where does geometric cognition come from?

Hohol Mateusz, Ph.D.

Our paper, written together by myself and Marcin Miłkowski, entitled Cognitive artifacts for geometric reasoning was published in Foundations of Science a few days ago (online first, open access). In our joint paper, we claim that explanations of geometric cognition should go beyond methodological individualism and take into account the role of distributed cognitive factors in the shaping of Euclidean geometry. In other words, we argue that abstract geometry that raised in ancient Greece cannot be satisfactorily explained only as a product of individual minds, or skull-bound cognitive processes. Instead, we propose that cognitive artifacts, i.e., diagrams and well-structured language, scaffolded visuospatial capacities of our brains, and contributed to building a unique cognitive niche within Euclidean geometry, originated as a result of collective thinking and problem-solving. In addition to this, we emphasize that in contrast to mental mechanisms of symbolic logical inference, mechanisms of diagrammatic inference are still weakly understood in cognitive science.

In the first part of the paper, we note that contemporary cognitive science of mathematics is focused on numbers and calculations much more than on the mental processing of geometry, which is reflected at least in bibliometric evidence. This does not, however, mean that cognitive scientists completely ignore geometry. The theory of cognitive systems of core geometric knowledge by Elizabeth Spelke is a creditable example that we discuss in the paper. In a nutshell, relying on developmental, neuroscientific, comparative, and evolutionarily data, Spelke claims that cognitive base of geometry consists of two phylogenetically ancient and ontogenetically early systems hardwired in the brain. We call these core systems, respectively, the system of layout geometry and the system of object geometry. The former is implemented in the hippocampus and surrounding structures of the vertebrate brain, and its primary function is supporting navigation in large-scale spatial layouts. The latter is localized in the lateral occipital complex and supports recognition of 2D shapes and 3D manipulable objects. According to Spelke, none of these systems, however, provide representations of geometric objects characterized by properties such as angle, sense, and length. Therefore, Euclidean representations involving all these geometric properties require a flexible combination of the core systems during ontogeny. Although Spelke agrees that the developmental shift toward a full-blooded representational system of geometry is mediated by cognitive artifacts, i.e., acquiring the language involving spatial expressions and using map-like scale objects, her account remains silent about shaping of geometric cognition in the historical time-scale.

Therefore, in the second part of our article, we explore the role of cognitive artifacts in the emergence of the Greek geometry, summarized in Euclid’s masterpiece, Elements. Drawing from the Reviel Netz’s approach called cognitive history, we look at properties and mutual relationships of two specific artifacts developed by Greek geometers. The first one is a lettered diagram, and the second one is the technical language composed of fixed strings of words, called–in line of a tradition of Homeric philological studies–formulae. Despite the fact that Babylonian, Egyptian, and Chinese geometers used diagrams before the Greeks, marking them with letters is a uniquely Greek invention. Letters associated with the points make diagrams something more than just auxiliary drawings that facilitate the initial recognition of the problem. On the one hand, thanks to letters Euclidean diagrams are strictly embedded in the discursive (textual) components of mathematical discourse that disambiguate theirs understanding. On the other hand, diagrams allow us to understand the text, because they determine geometric points. One of the crucial discoveries about Greek geometry is that diagrams are full-blooded deductive components of proofs, and without them many statements would lose their truth-value. Furthermore, according to Netz, a fine-grained logical network established by diagrams and linguistic formulae is sufficient to make geometric reasoning compelling and it’s results universally valid. Last but not least, as the researcher claims, lettered diagrams serve as a substitute for mathematical ontology, which means that the geometer does not have to participate in ontological discussions about the semantics of diagrams.

Although we fully agree with Netz about the role of the cognitive artifacts in the shaping of the deductive practices in Greek mathematics, we simultaneously point out two problems. The first one is associated with a thesis that the diagram serves as a substitute for the ontology of geometry. In our opinion, the use of the geometric cognitive artifacts should be investigated from both an epistemological and an ontological point of view. We claim that while using diagrams (and formulae as well) epistemologically non-neutral (in Netz’s line), but ontologically neutral (contrary to Netz). Diagrams constrain the permitted steps in the proof (and thus they indeed contribute to establishing deductive practices), but at the same time do not constrain ontological commitments of geometry. In other words, a mathematician is capable of proving proofs characterized by the necessity of subsequent inferences and the generality of the outputs, however, he or she has still the free choice of mathematical ontology. We ground this thesis in the historical setting, showing that debates about the ontology of geometry existed in ancient times. For instance, the constructive school of Menaechemus accepted the literal interpretation of Euclidean constructions, while Speusippus claimed that constructions should be considered only as heuristic devices, that allow mathematicians to grasp Platonic geometric ideas. To sum up, we claim that deductive practices of Greeks were ontologically neutral.

The second problem with Netz’s cognitive history is that although it elucidates the emergence of two hallmark epistemic properties of Euclidean geometry, namely, necessity and generality of proof, it, however, lacks a substantial account of geometric operations that are performed using these cognitive artifacts. Looking at Proposition 1 of the Book 1 of Euclid’s Elements we show that linguistic formulae supplemented by the diagram indeed reflects inference steps leading to a universal result in a necessity-preserving way, but all the internal, or cognitive, work remains hidden beneath these external representations. By referring to Peirce’s and Magnani’s works we claim that investigation of cognitive foundations of geometric reasoning should go beyond the deductive product that is easy to observe in the final proof and elucidate abductive operations (or manipulative abductions in Magnani’s terms) performed on the diagram. In our opinion, further studies on geometric cognition should look not only at the context of justification but explain the context of discovery, in an empirically grounded way.

Even though our investigation is far from complete, especially regarding cognitive operations involved in geometric reasoning, we stress that cognitive artifacts play a non-negligible role in the emergence of full-blooded geometric cognition not only in the developmental time-scale but also in the historical one. Therefore, our message is that the studies on geometric cognition should take into account not only individual cognitive factors but also distributed cognitive practices facilitated, or even constituted, by external devices.

The above and related problems are further elucidated in my forthcoming book entitled Foundations of Geometric Cognition, which will be published in autumn 2019 by Routledge.

Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity