Fallible Heuristics and Evaluation of Research Traditions. The Case of Embodied Cognition

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/RF/article/view/RF.2019.031
Rights ##submission.copyrightStatement##
Volume 75
Issue 2
Pages 223-236
Publication Ruch Filozoficzny
ISSN 2545-3173
Date 2019/06/22
DOI 10.12775/RF.2019.031
Accessed 2019-06-23 11:09:42
Library Catalog apcz.umk.pl
Language en
Abstract In this paper, I argue that embodied cognition, like many other research traditions in cognitive science, offers mostly fallible research heuristics rather than
grand principles true of all cognitive processing. To illustrate this claim, I discuss
Aizawa’s rebuttal of embodied and enactive accounts of vision. While Aizawa’s argument is sound against a strong reading of the enactive account, it does not
undermine the way embodied cognition proceeds, because the claim he attacks
is one of fallible heuristics. These heuristics may be helpful in developing models
of cognition in an interdisciplinary fashion. I briefly discuss the issue of whether
this fallibility actually makes embodied cognition vulnerable to charges of being untestable or non-scientific. I also stress that the historical approach to this
research tradition suggests that embodied cognition is not poised to become
a grand unified theory of cognition.

Source: Publications

Epistemic Challenges: Engaging Philosophically in Cognitive Science

Type Journal Article
Author Przemysław R. Nowakowski
URL https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/RF/article/view/RF.2019.032
Rights ##submission.copyrightStatement##
Volume 75
Issue 2
Pages 237-255
Publication Ruch Filozoficzny
ISSN 2545-3173
Date 2019/06/22
DOI 10.12775/RF.2019.032
Accessed 2019-06-23 11:07:39
Library Catalog apcz.umk.pl
Language en
Abstract In this article, I show the role that the philosopher of cognitive science can currently play in cognitive science research. I argue for the important, and not yet considered, role of the philosophy of cognitive science in cognitive science, that
is, the importance of cooperation between philosophers of science with cognitive scientists in investigating the research methods and theoretical assumptions of cognitive science. At the beginning of the paper I point out, how the
philosopher of science, here, the philosopher of cognitive science, can participate
in interdisciplinary research. I am opting of the cooperation in investigating the
so-called reflective problems. Then, I discuss four examples of issues important
for the cognitive science, in which the competences possessed by the philosopher
are useful. At the ending I point out wider landscape of possible cooperation
of philosophers with cognitive scientists.
Short Title Wyzwania epistemiczne

Source: Publications

Cognitive Artifacts for Geometric Reasoning

Type Journal Article
Author Mateusz Hohol
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10699-019-09603-w
Publication Foundations of Science
ISSN 1233-1821, 1572-8471
Date 2019-5-4
Journal Abbr Found Sci
DOI 10.1007/s10699-019-09603-w
Accessed 2019-05-08 07:48:30
Library Catalog DOI.org (Crossref)
Language en
Abstract In this paper, we focus on the development of geometric cognition. We argue that to understand how geometric cognition has been constituted, one must appreciate not only individual cognitive factors, such as phylogenetically ancient and ontogenetically early core cognitive systems, but also the social history of the spread and use of cognitive artifacts. In particular, we show that the development of Greek mathematics, enshrined in Euclid’s Elements, was driven by the use of two tightly intertwined cognitive artifacts: the use of lettered diagrams; and the creation of linguistic formulae (namely non-compositional fixed strings of words used repetitively within authors and between them). Together, these artifacts formed the professional language of geometry. In this respect, the case of Greek geometry clearly shows that explanations of geometric reasoning have to go beyond the confines of methodological individualism to account for how the distributed practice of artifact use has stabilized over time. This practice, as we suggest, has also contributed heavily to the understanding of what mathematical proof is; classically, it has been assumed that proofs are not merely deductively correct but also remain invariant over various individuals sharing the same cognitive practice. Cognitive artifacts in Greek geometry constrained the repertoire of admissible inferential operations, which made these proofs inter-subjectively testable and compelling. By focusing on the cognitive operations on artifacts, we also stress that mental mechanisms that contribute to these operations are still poorly understood, in contrast to those mechanisms which drive symbolic logical inference.

Source: Publications

Mechanistic Computational Individuation without Biting the Bullet

Type Journal Article
Author Nir Fresco
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL https://academic.oup.com/bjps/advance-article/doi/10.1093/bjps/axz005/5305023
Publication The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Journal Abbr Br J Philos Sci
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axz005
Accessed 2019-02-07 10:44:19
Library Catalog academic.oup.com
Language en
Abstract Abstract. Is the mathematical function being computed by a given physical system determined by the system’s dynamics? This question is at the heart of the inde

Source: Publications