The purpose of the seminar is to review explanatory methods used in cognitive science. Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary enterprise, with various research agendas and profiles, so to understand various explanatory methods it is indispensable to look at different approaches used to explain cognitive phenomena. We will start with classical computational and symbolic theories of cognition, and then look at parallel distributed processing (PDP) models, dynamical, sensorimotor and embodied theories of the mind, and behavioral robotics. It will be also important to see what is the role of mental representation in explaining cognition, on the various approaches to computer simulation and models. In a way, this seminar can be treated as an introduction to the methodology of cognitive science. This introduction stresses the explanatory pluralism in contemporary research rather than argues for a single model that would fit all needs.
The model of explanation used in cognitive science that will be reconstructed based on actual and classical research papers. Yet, we will also look at programmatic manifestos and briefly review the accounts of explanation used from philosophy of science (the covering-law model and mechanistic explanation).
The seminar “Chalmers and His Critics” (Philosophy of Being, Cognition, and Value at University of Warsaw) takes place every Wednesday, at 18:30 in room 12 (Institute of Philosophy, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3).
The volume we edited with Konrad Talmont-Kamiński has just been published. Here is the blurb:
The contributors to this volume engage with issues of normativity within naturalised philosophy. The issues are critical to naturalism as most traditional notions in philosophy, such as knowledge, justification or representation, are said to involve normativity. Some of the contributors pursue the question of the correct place of normativity within a naturalised ontology, with emergentist and eliminativist answers offered on neighbouring pages. Others seek to justify particular norms within a naturalised framework, the more surprising ones including naturalist takes on the a priori and intuitions. Finally, yet others examine concrete examples of the application of norms within particular epistemic endeavours, such as psychopathology and design. The overall picture is that of an intimate engagement with issues of normativity on the part of naturalist philosophers – questioning some of the fundamentals at the same time as they try to work out many of the details.