Fallible Heuristics and Evaluation of Research Traditions. The Case of Embodied Cognition

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/RF/article/view/RF.2019.031
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Volume 75
Issue 2
Pages 223-236
Publication Ruch Filozoficzny
ISSN 2545-3173
Date 2019/06/22
DOI 10.12775/RF.2019.031
Accessed 2019-06-23 11:09:42
Library Catalog apcz.umk.pl
Language en
Abstract In this paper, I argue that embodied cognition, like many other research traditions in cognitive science, offers mostly fallible research heuristics rather than
grand principles true of all cognitive processing. To illustrate this claim, I discuss
Aizawa’s rebuttal of embodied and enactive accounts of vision. While Aizawa’s argument is sound against a strong reading of the enactive account, it does not
undermine the way embodied cognition proceeds, because the claim he attacks
is one of fallible heuristics. These heuristics may be helpful in developing models
of cognition in an interdisciplinary fashion. I briefly discuss the issue of whether
this fallibility actually makes embodied cognition vulnerable to charges of being untestable or non-scientific. I also stress that the historical approach to this
research tradition suggests that embodied cognition is not poised to become
a grand unified theory of cognition.

Source: Publications

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