| Type | Journal Article |
|---|---|
| Author | Marcin Miłkowski |
| URL | https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/RF/article/view/RF.2019.031 |
| Rights | ##submission.copyrightStatement## |
| Volume | 75 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 223-236 |
| Publication | Ruch Filozoficzny |
| ISSN | 2545-3173 |
| Date | 2019/06/22 |
| DOI | 10.12775/RF.2019.031 |
| Accessed | 2019-06-23 11:09:42 |
| Library Catalog | apcz.umk.pl |
| Language | en |
| Abstract | In this paper, I argue that embodied cognition, like many other research traditions in cognitive science, offers mostly fallible research heuristics rather than grand principles true of all cognitive processing. To illustrate this claim, I discuss Aizawa’s rebuttal of embodied and enactive accounts of vision. While Aizawa’s argument is sound against a strong reading of the enactive account, it does not undermine the way embodied cognition proceeds, because the claim he attacks is one of fallible heuristics. These heuristics may be helpful in developing models of cognition in an interdisciplinary fashion. I briefly discuss the issue of whether this fallibility actually makes embodied cognition vulnerable to charges of being untestable or non-scientific. I also stress that the historical approach to this research tradition suggests that embodied cognition is not poised to become a grand unified theory of cognition. |
Source: Publications