Luke Kersten – The Status of Markov Blankets: An Abstracta Realist Proposal

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for June, 11th, at 12:00 (CET). Our guest will be Luke Kersten (University of Edinburgh). We will discuss a draft paper:The Status of Markov Blankets: An Abstracta Realist Proposal.


Abstract:
 This paper takes up a recent challenge to the use of Markov blankets in the context of demarcating the boundaries of cognition, what I call the “status problem”. The status problem says that while it makes sense to think of Markov blankets as either a methodological tool for investigating cognitive systems or an ontological category for determining the boundaries of systems, it does not make sense to think of them as both. The status problem generates a dilemma, either: i) Markov blankets are a purely formal tool, in which case they do not help to demarcate the boundaries of the cognition, or ii) they denote an ontological category, in which case they do help to demarcate the boundaries of cognition but only at the cost of taking on controversial metaphysical assumptions. After surveying potential responses, I argue that progress can be made on the status problem by reconceptualising Markov blankets as ‘abstracta’. This, I suggest, enables one to not only provide an answer to the status problem, but also avoid the dilemma.

To receive a Google Meet link, please email Przemysław Nowakowski at pnowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

Podane dalej. Inna książka o dizajnie

Type Journal Article
Author Witold Wachowski
URL http://avant.edu.pl/2020-03-43
Volume 11
Issue 3
Publication AVANT. The Journal of the Philosophical-Interdisciplinary Vanguard
Date 2020
Journal Abbr AVANT
DOI 10.26913/avant.2020.03.43
Accessed 2021-05-24 11:48:52
Library Catalog DOI.org (Crossref)

Source: Publications

Marvan, Polák, Bachmann, Phillips: Apical Amplification – A Cellular Mechanism of Conscious Perception?

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for May, 14th, at 12:00 (CET). Our guest will be Tomáš Marvan (Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy, Prague). We will discuss a draft paper by Tomáš Marvan, Michal Polák (University of West Bohemia), Talis Bachmann (University of Tartu), William A. Phillip (University of Stirling): Apical Amplification – A Cellular Mechanism of Conscious Perception?  William Philips will be also present on our seminar.

Abstract: We present a theoretical view of the cellular foundations for network-level processes involved in producing our conscious experience. Inputs to apical synapses in layer 1 of a large subset of neocortical cells are summed at an integration zone near the top of their apical trunk. These inputs come from diverse sources, and provide a context within which the transmission of information abstracted from sensory input to their basal and perisomatic synapses can be amplified when relevant. We argue that apical amplication (AA) makes perceptual experience more flexible and thus more adaptive by making it sensitive to context. It restrains recurrence by avoiding strong loops, and makes broadcasting feasible while preserving the distinctive informational identity of the cells receiving the broadcast. As AA is highly dependent on cholinergic, aminergic, and other neuromodulators, it forms a bridge between global states of consciousness and the specific contents of conscious experience, thus treating both in a unified theoretical framework. Thus, apical amplification might provide a cellular mechanism that is crucial to our conscious perceptual experience.

Email Przemysław Nowakowski pnowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl for a Google Meet link.

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

Correspondence Theory of Semantic Information

Type Journal Article
Author Marcin Miłkowski
URL https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/714804
Publication The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
ISSN 0007-0882
Date April 15, 2021
Extra Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
DOI 10.1086/714804
Accessed 2021-04-22 08:39:35
Library Catalog journals.uchicago.edu (Atypon)

Source: Publications

Paweł Gładziejewski: Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for April, 16th, at 12:00 (CET). Our guest will be Paweł Gładziejewski (Department of Cognitive Science, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun). We will discuss a draft paper: Perceptual justification in the Bayesian brain: A foundherentist account

Abstract: In this paper, I use the predictive processing (PP) theory of perception to tackle the question of how perceptual states can be rationally involved in cognition by justifying other mental states. I put forward two claims regarding the epistemological implications of PP. First, perceptual states can confer justification on other mental states because the perceptual states are themselves rationally acquired. Second, despite being inferentially justified rather than epistemically basic, perceptual states can still be epistemically responsive to the mind- independent world. My main goal is to elucidate the epistemology of perception already implicit in PP. But I also hope to show how it is possible to peacefully combine central tenets of foundationalist and coherentist accounts of the rational powers of perception while avoiding the well-recognized pitfalls of either.

To get a Google Meet link, email Przemysław Nowakowski at pnowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

Uljana Feest: Data Quality, Experimental Artifacts, and the Reactivity of the Psychological Subject Matter

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for April, 9th, at 16:00 (CET). Note the change of the usual time! Our guest will be Uljana Feest (Institut für Philosophie, Leibniz Universität Hannover). We will discuss a draft paper: Data Quality, Experimental Artifacts, and the Reactivity of the Psychological Subject Matter

Abstract: While the term “reactivity” has come to be associated with specific phenomena in the social sciences, having to do with subjects’ awareness of being studied, this paper takes a broader stance on this concept. I will argue that reactivity is a ubiquitous feature of the psychological subject matter and that this fact is a precondition of experimental research, while also posing potential problems for the experimenter. The latter are connected to the worry about distorted data and experimental artifacts. But what are experimental artifacts and what is the most productive way of dealing with them? In this paper, I approach these questions by exploring the ways in which experimenters in psychology simultaneously exploit and suppress the reactivity of their subject matter in order to produce experimental data that speak to the question or subject matter at hand. Highlighting the artificiality of experimental data. I will raise (and answer) the question of what distinguishes a genuine experimental result from an experimental artifact. My analysis construes experimental results as the outcomes of inferences from the data that take material background assumptions as auxiliary premises. Artifacts occur when one or more of these background assumptions are false, such that the data do not reliably serve the purposes they were generated for. I will conclude by laying out the ways in which my analysis of data quality is relevant to, and informed by, recent debates about the replicability of experimental results.

To receive a Google Meet link, please email Przemysław Nowakowski at pnowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

Lilia Gurova: Feigned narratives do not always satisfy needs: the case of factitious disorders

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for March, 26th, at 12:00 (CET). Our guest will be Lilia Gurova (Department of Cognitive Science and Psychology, New Bulgarian University). We will discuss a draft paper: Feigned narratives do not always satisfy needs: the case of factitious disorders.

The paper abstract: When Bradley Lewis announced in 2014 that psychiatry needed to make a “narrative turn”, he backed up his appeal as follows: (1) the different explanatory models of mental disorders that are currently competing in psychiatry tell us different stories about mental health; (2) none of these stories has the privilege of being the only true one, and its alternatives the wrong ones; (3) the choice of a model in each case should be made in a dialogue with the patient in order to ensure that the model will be chosen that best meets the patient’s goals and desires and, accordingly, would best support the process of recovery. The latter suggestion however is not easy to follow when the patients’ subjective goals and desires and the goal of returning the patients to a normal way of life diverge, as is the case with the so-called factitious disorders. The problem is worsen by the theory-ladenness of the interpretations of patients’ first-person narratives. This paper argues against a common assumption that biases our understanding of abnormal behavior, in particular the behavior of those who feign stories about illness. This is the assumption that such a behavior satisfies certain, possibly unknown, psychological needs.

The seminar is focused on discussing the papers, in a reading group style. The speaker first introduces the main theses of the paper (for around ten minutes), and then the floor is open for comments. In the online version of the seminar, the questions must be first signaled briefly on the chat to manage the flow of the discussion.

Mail Przemysław Nowakowski (p.nowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl) for the Google Meet link.

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

Tactile information counteracts the attenuation of rubber hand illusion attributable to increased visuo-proprioceptive divergence

Type Journal Article
Author Piotr Litwin
Author Beata Zybura
Author Paweł Motyka
Editor Inmaculada Riquelme
URL https://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244594
Volume 15
Issue 12
Pages e0244594
Publication PLOS ONE
ISSN 1932-6203
Date 2020-12-30
Journal Abbr PLoS ONE
DOI 10.1371/journal.pone.0244594
Accessed 2021-03-14 10:46:42
Library Catalog DOI.org (Crossref)
Language en
Abstract Sense of body ownership is an immediate and distinct experience of one’s body as belonging to oneself. While it is well-recognized that ownership feelings emerge from the integration of visual and somatosensory signals, the principles upon which they are integrated are still intensely debated. Here, we used the rubber hand illusion (RHI) to examine how the interplay of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals is governed depending on their spatiotemporal properties. For this purpose, the RHI was elicited in different conditions varying with respect to the extent of visuo-proprioceptive divergence (i.e., the distance between the real and fake hands) and differing in terms of the availability and spatiotemporal complexity of tactile stimulation (none, simple, or complex). We expected that the attenuating effect of distance on illusion strength will be more pronounced in the absence of touch (when proprioception gains relatively higher importance) and absent in the presence of complex tactile signals. Additionally, we hypothesized that participants with greater proprioceptive acuity—assessed using an elbow joint position discrimination task—will be less susceptible to the illusion, but only under the conditions of limited tactile stimulation. In line with our prediction, RHI was attenuated at the farthest distance only when tactile information was absent or simplified, but the attenuation was effectively prevented by the use of complex tactile stimulation—in this case, RHI was comparably vivid at both distances. However, passive proprioceptive acuity was not related to RHI strength in either of the conditions. The results indicate that complex-structured tactile signals can override the influence of proprioceptive signals in body attribution processes. These findings extend our understanding of body ownership by showing that it is primarily determined by informative cues from the most relevant sensory domains, rather than mere accumulation of multisensory evidence.

Source: Publications

Kiverstein & Kirchhoff, Dissolving the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for March, 12th, at 12:00 (CET)  (NOTE THIS COULD CHANGE!). Our guest will be Julian KIverstein (and possibly Michael Kirchhoff). We will discuss a draft paper by J. Kiverstein and M. Kirchhoff, Dissolving the Causal-Constitutive Fallacy: Diachronic Constitution and the Metaphysics of the Extended Mind.

The paper abstract:
This paper questions the causal-constitutive fallacy raised against the thesis of the extended mind. It does so by arguing for  an inherently temporal view of the constitution relation: diachronic constitution. The notion of constitution, in common with other metaphysical dependence relations such as composition, realisation and grounding,  is standardly cast in entirely atemporal terms. We will argue however that temporalising the constitution relation is not as remarkable (nor problematic) as it might initially seem. It is (almost) inevitable, given local interactions between microscale and macroscale states of (coupled) dynamical systems. We primarily focus on the metaphysics of the extended mind in this paper. However, crucially we also show how our account of diachronic constitution has important implications for the metaphysics of dependence relations more generally as well as an emerging literature on inter-level explanations in the mechanistic framework.

The seminar is focused on discussing the papers, in a reading group style. The speaker first introduces the main theses of the paper (for around ten minutes), and then the floor is open for comments. In the online version of the seminar, the questions must be first signaled briefly on the chat to manage the flow of the discussion.

Mail Przemysław Nowakowski (p.nowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl) for the Google Meet link.

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity

Frazier, Calvo & Lee: The Neuro-Power of Movement in Plants

The next meeting of the seminar is planned for March, 5th, at 12:45 (CET) – note the change of the hour. Our guest will be Paco Calvo. We will discuss a draft paper by P. Adrian Frazier, Paco Calvo and David N. Lee, The Neuro-Power of Movement in Plants.

The paper has no official abstract yet but here’s the first paragraph:

The idea that plants are intelligent might not be a surprise to readers of Darwin’s “The Power of Movement in Plants”, published in 1880 and written with the help of his son, Francis. Drawing comparisons between plant and animal movements, and between root tips and the brains of lower animals, Darwin stopped just short of making an explicit argument for the intelligence of plants (cf. his arguments for earthworm intelligence in his 1881 book). He was particularly impressed by the fact that sensors could be located one place (the tips) and their effect (turgidity, or cell elongation) observed somewhere else, which he described as a “transmission of influence” from sensor to motor. Noting that plants have no nerves, he suggested that animal nerves are not for transmission, per se, but for more precise transmission. Darwin’s observations set the stage for the field of plant neurobiology, whose mission has been to put psychological meat
on the bare bones of Darwin’s suggestions.

The seminar is focused on discussing the papers, in a reading group style. The speaker first introduces the main theses of the paper (for around ten minutes), and then the floor is open for comments. In the online version of the seminar, the questions must be first signaled briefly on the chat to manage the flow of the discussion.

To receive a Google Meet link, please email Przemysław Nowakowski, p.nowakowski@ifispan.edu.pl

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Source: Cognitive Science in Search of Unity